Is it harder to enter an emerging market or an established one? The answer seems obvious at first; certainly it would be more difficult to start a new automobile manufacturer now than it would have been 100 years ago. Nonetheless, the literature on industry evolution does not support such a definite conclusion. For example, resource mobilization might be easier in established industries. Stinchcombe (1965) emphasized the liability of newness that organizations face when they enter a new field of production. New organizations must develop new roles and trust, both internally among employees and externally with customers and suppliers. While entrepreneurs in mature industries can draw on institutional norms and existing modes of organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) , the lack of social structure exacerbates the liability of newness for organizations entering emerging industries (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . On the other hand, competitive forces could make established industries more difficult to enter. As inefficient firms leave the market, the minimum level of efficiency necessary to survive rises. Thus, important resource holders might wish to avoid the risk associated with entering these competitive markets.
I suggest that learning at the level of the organizational population creates asymmetry in density dependent processes. On the one hand, selection increases the average competitive strength of each organization remaining in the population. On the other hand, selection tends to space maximally the competitors left in the market. Thus, the likelihood of competitive interaction decreases over time. Selection both raises barriers to entry by increasing the minimum organizational efficacy required to survive and sets the seeds of destruction to those barriers by opening up regions of uncontested resources. This paper provides a theoretical framework for this asymmetry. Namely, evolutionary processes inherently create temporal asymmetry. I also offer a modeling strategy for testing this proposition. Finally, the paper presents estimates for the model in the American automobile industry. Entry rates of firms into the American automobile industry during show support for historical asymmetry in density dependent processes as a function of selection.
Two forces drive industrial evolution according to organizational ecology: legitimation and competition. In the density-dependent formulation of this model, the density, or more accurately, counts, of organizations within a particular industry serve as a measurable proxy for both of these forces. This formulation leads to an ahistorical symmetry, or reversibility, in organizational population dynamics. In other words, one would expect a new industry with only five organizations to behave similarly to a hundred-year-old industry with the same number of firms. Nevertheless, one feels intuitively that these two situations are quite different. Industries evolve over time in ways that might be difficult if not impossible to reverse.
Imagine that organizations differ in abilities when they enter the environment. These differences give some firms an advantage in acquiring resources. From an economics perspective, these advantages could manifest themselves as differences in the cost of production (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) . Organizational ecology tends to be more catholic regarding the source of these advantages, but in either case, some firms fit the environment better than others. Assuming that inefficient firms fail sooner than their more efficacious rivals, one would expect the average organizational efficiency of the population to increase over time. Even if each firm is inert (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) , the population of organizations can learn (i.e. improve its efficiency) by selecting and retaining better fitting members.
Although selection improves the average fitness level of organizations in a population over time, it also decreases the competitive intensity among the surviving firms by distributing them more evenly across the resource space. When organizations generate stronger competition locally (i.e. with organizations that exploit similar resources) than globally, competitors in crowded regions of the resource space realize higher failure rates than those in sparse segments of the niche (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . Researchers have found this effect across a variety of dimensions including geography (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Sorenson and Audia 1998) , market segments (Baum and Singh, 1994) , and technological domains (Podolny, Stuart and Hannan, 1996) . This heterogeneity in exit rates continues until organizations become maximally spaced across the resource space.
In addition to asymmetry in competition due to selection, legitimation might also behave asymmetrically. Hannan (1997) notes that legitimation probably exhibits 'stickiness'. In other words, populations retain their legitimacy even after density declines. Although early entrants have difficulty establishing ties and assembling resources because constituents doubt these unproven markets, this problem probably dissipates, despite low levels of density, as industries mature. Before considering in detail the sources of asymmetry in population dynamics, it might be useful to review the basic ecological model.
DENSITY DEPENDENT PROCESSES
The standard formulation of density-dependence hypothesizes two forces, legitimacy and competition, that drive population vital rates (i.e. founding and mortality). Increased legitimacy leads to increased founding rates and decreased mortality rates, whereas increases in competition lead to decreases in founding rates and increases in mortality rates. Legitimacy and competition cannot be measured directly. Rather, ecologists assume both forces to be a function of the contemporaneous number of organizations in a population, an observable attribute (Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . Hannan and Carroll (1992) suggest that "taken-forgrantedness" best defines legitimacy. Essentially, it is the degree to which institutions and other con-stituents accept an organizational form as a "reasonable" business venture. Institutional theory asserts that modern institutional relationships create strong normative forces that shape organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . As such, legitimacy increases the resources available to existing firms and potential entrepreneurs in a given industry. Legitimacy also decreases the costs associated with mobilizing these resources to found new organizations. Thus, legitimacy increases founding rates (Hannan, 1989) . From the "taken-for-grantedness" definition, one can easily see that contemporaneous density correlates with legitimacy. When an organizational form exists in greater numbers, it is more likely to be "taken-for-granted." Nevertheless, some debate about the functional form of this relationship ensues. In the original specification of density-dependence, legitimation increases with density at a decreasing rate (Hannan, 1989) , whereas subsequent revisions of the theory posit a sigmoidal relationship with legitimacy increasing at an increasing rate to some inflection point where the rate begins decreasing (Hannan, 1991; Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . Regardless, the predictions of ecological theory follow as long as some ceiling limits the degree to which contemporaneous density can increase legitimation (Peli, 1993; Hannan, 1997) .
Competition in the density-dependent model refers to competition for resources due to niche overlap (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . Let us assume that organizations have a fundamental niche. This fundamental niche is the n-dimensional resource volume within which organizational growth is non-negative. When these niches overlap, organizations compete for resources. These overlaps create zerosum relationships between firms relative to a set of resources in the environment. Intense competition suppresses founding rates because the resources necessary for organizing new ventures become exceedingly difficult to acquire. Moreover, rational capital markets might be reluctant to support entry into crowded niches (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . Within a bounded space, density has a clear relationship to competition; the number of possible competitive relations is proportional to the square of the number of organizations within the niche.
1 Thus, one would expect competition to increase as a function of the square of density. Of course, the volume of the niche could expand for a variety of reasons including product proliferation (Mason, 1985; Sorenson, 1998) , increasing dimensionality in consumer preferences (Peli and Nooteboom, 1999) or expanding interest in the niche due to the presence of high status actors (Podolny and Stuart, 1995) . Nonetheless, unless the niche expands on the same order as the number of competitive interactions, one would still expect competition to increase at an increasing rate with density. Those approaches that specify the expansion of the niche suggest that it will occur at a decreasing rate with increases in density (Sorenson, 1998; Peli and Nooteboom, 1999) .
Together, legitimation and competition create a nonmonotonic (inverted U-shape) relationship between density and founding rates. At low levels of density, one expects founding rates to be low because of the lack of legitimacy. As density increases, founding rates increase up to some inflection point at which the competition effect overwhelms the legitimation effect. Beyond this point, founding rates decrease as density increases. Researchers typically model this relationship as a log-quadratic 2 function between density and founding rates as shown in (1): (1) where λ is the founding rate at time t, n is the density at time t, γ 0 scales the effects and the γ's are coefficients for the magnitude of the first-and second-order terms. If , the first order effect, γ 1 , can be interpreted as the legitimacy effect, while γ 2 informs us about competition (Hannan, 1991) . Most published research on founding rates finds this nonmonotonic relationship in the absence of left truncation in the population history (Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Hannan and Carroll, 1995; Baum, 1996) .
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ASYMMETRY IN DENSITY DEPENDENCE
Although the density dependent model shows impressive explanatory power and generality, the ahistorical implications of density-dependence strike a dissonant chord (Baum and Powell, 1995) . Despite its intuitive appeal, little ecological work considers asymmetry in density dependence. Hannan (1997) provides one notable exception with his attempt to incorporate temporal heterogeneity into the density dependent model. He argues that legitimation and contemporaneous density have an asymmetric relationship. Essentially, density dependence becomes less relevant to legitimacy over time as a result of 'stickiness' in legitimacy. He also notes that contemporaneous density might become less relevant to competition because structuring of the population through differentiation (e.g., Carroll, 1985; Podolny 1993 ) could lead to a decline in competitive interaction. To test these ideas, Hannan (1997) interacts the standard density terms with the first and second order of industry age. Although this functional form is not theoretically motivated, he does find evidence of temporal heterogeneity in density dependence in the founding rates of European automobile manufacturers. Specifically, density dependence appears to decline in importance as the population ages. This result matches earlier founding analyses of the same data . In addition to the factors mentioned by Hannan (1997) , at least three earlier extensions of the density-dependent formulation could account for temporal asymmetry.
Resource partitioning suggests that industries separate into generalists and specialists as they evolve (Carroll, 1985) . Intensifying competition among generalists for the center of the market decreases their attention on other segments of the market. Peli and Nooteboom (1999) generalize this process to multiple dimensions. This differentiation leads to expectations of weaker competition over time among specialists than the original density-dependent model suggests.
Mass-dependence offers another possible source of asymmetry since organizations in mature markets tend to be much larger than those found in fledgling industries. Barnett and Amburgey (1990) test the hypothesis that larger organizations generate more intense competition; however, they fail to find support for this hypothesis in a study of the failure rates of Illinois banks. Likewise, Sorenson (1997) finds no evidence of mass dependence in exits from the computer workstation industry. Although it seems surprising that large firms do not compete more intensely, little support exists for changes in the size distribution of organizational populations as a source of asymmetry in density-dependence.
Learning at the organizational level provides another possible avenue for creating asymmetry. For example, Barnett and Hansen (1996) find that organizations generate stronger competition as they gain experience in a study of Illinois bank failure rates. Rapid adaptation stimulated by intense competition among a stable set of competitors generates this "Red Queen" effect. This effect also manifests itself in founding rates of the same population (Barnett and Sorenson, 1998) . Since the average experience of individual organizations within a population tends to increase as the industry ages, competition might intensify as the industry evolves. This expectation, however, does not fit the results found in the European automobile industries . Competition amongst all organizations actually declines as the industries mature.
None of these approaches consider the manner in which learning at the population level through the systematic selection and retention of organizations might alter population dynamics. Moreover, although temporal asymmetry has been modeled as an interaction between industry age and density, chronological time, per se, does not actually affect density-dependence. Rather, evolutionary processes create asymmetry in population dynamics. The interaction of variation and selection in relatively stable environments creates an irreversible, asymmetric history in evolving populations. Chronological time serves as a rough proxy for these evolutionary processes because they occur over clock time. Nevertheless, this relationship need not be linear, or, for that matter, even parametric. Thus, evolutionary time, rather than chronological time provides a better means for investigating change in the nature of density-dependence.
POPULATION LEVEL LEARNING
Through the process of adaptation at the population level, industries evolve over time. Adaptive processes minimally involve variation and selection (Casti, 1995) . Together, variation and selection form the clock that governs the evolutionary process. Both of these mechanisms exist at the level of the organizational population. In my model, variation in the population occurs through the founding of new organizations. Although existing firms could potentially innovate, both theoretical and empirical arguments suggest otherwise. 3 Theoretically, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that selection pressures will weed out of the population organizations that do not operate in a stable manner. Empirically, recent research by Sørensen and Stuart (1999) shows that firms search more locally as they age. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that much, if not most, innovation comes from new firms. Selection comes in the form of failures of individual organizations within the population. 4 Together, these mechanisms allow an industry to adapt to the constraints of the resource space, assuming the resource distributions do not shift drastically.
Through variation, populations find combinations of attributes (i.e. ways of doing business) better suited to the environment than those currently in existence. As entrepreneurs discover better combinations, it becomes increasingly difficult for future entrants to find variants better suited to the environmental conditions. Although existing firms provide models for organizing, these molds also constrain the ideas of entrepreneurs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Thus, the net effect of heredity on population dynamics is unclear. These more efficacious organizations increase the competitive intensity of the niche at a higher rate than less-effective forms. Nevertheless, variation makes little difference until combined with selection.
Selection creates temporal asymmetry. It alters internal competition in two competing ways. First, if one assumes that selection tends to remove less fit firms from the industry, the average fitness of a popu- lation will tend to increase in a stable environment as a function of the history of selection. Figure 1 schematically illustrates the effect of selection on the distribution of fitness. Assume that firms arrive with heterogeneous fitness (normally distributed in Figure 1) . Selection truncates the distribution below some level, the selection threshold. Although the figure illustrates selection as a fixed line, it actually acts probabilistically on firms. Undoubtedly, some poorly fit organizations survive despite intense competitive pressure. Likewise, some efficacious firms die. Nonetheless, stochastic truncation shifts the mean of the distribution upward (to the right in Figure 1) . 5 Stronger competitors should create more intense pressure relative to their numbers (Barnett 1997) . Thus this increased fitness presumably increases the competitive intensity within the population.
Nevertheless, selection can also reduce competition amongst organizations in a population. If one assumes that intense competition increases selection pressures against organizations in that region of the niche, firms whose niches overlap heavily with be able to predict which organizations survive, those that do will overlap less in their niches.
6 At the population level, this process spreads survivors out across the resource space. Figure 2 demonstrates this process. Given the population in Frame A, one would expect selection to create a distribution more like Frame B than Frame C (generated from random selection). Thus, competitive interaction among the survivors decreases. Nevertheless, a priori, it is difficult to determine which effect, increased average fitness or niche differentiation, should dominate. Moreover, the predominating effect might vary over the population history.
Justification for temporal asymmetry also exists for the legitimation process (Baum and Powell, 1995; Hannan and Carroll, 1995; Hannan, 1997) . Most organizational populations have low densities in both their early and mature stages. Nevertheless, legitimacy probably decreases little in the low-density, yet highly concentrated, mature period (Hannan, 1997) . As "taken-for-grantedness," legitimacy changes as a function of both the occurrence of a form historically and the number of organizations other firms will be selected out of the population at a higher rate. Thus, firms that occupy crowded positions in the resource space fail more often. The ecology literature refers to this phenomenon as localized competition. Several studies show support for localized competition across segments of the consumer market (Baum and Singh, 1994) , technological expertise (Podolny, Stuart and Hannan, 1996) and geography (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Sorenson and Audia, 1998) . While one might not currently in that niche. Early organizations in a niche contribute quite heavily to the cognitive legitimacy of the organizational form. Nevertheless, as more instances of the form occur, the importance of both the contemporaneous density and additional foundings to legitimacy declines (Hannan, 1997 Researchers use contemporaneous density to model the effects of legitimacy and competition on organizational populations. Likewise, the impact of population-level adaptation can be related to population processes through evolutionary history. Therefore, I offer a new organizational founding rate model that merges the density-dependent aspects of organizational evolution with population-level adaptation.
REVISING THE FOUNDING RATE MODEL
To investigate history dependence in density dependent processes, evolutionary time must be specified. In evolutionary processes, the total number of trials critically affects both the variety of combinations tested and the potential for selection. Furthermore, both of these processes experience decreasing returns. Organizational populations tend to find better organizational forms at a known rate based on the number of trials. This rate relates closely to Feller's theory of records. Feller (1971) investigated the rate at which new athletic records occur. He found that every time a new record was set, it became even more difficult for that new record to be broken in the future. In fact, Feller found that the expected waiting period between records doubles every time a new record is established. Nevertheless, this result assumes that the rate of new attempts remains relatively constant. Thus, one might find deviations from this rate when the number of participants in an athletic event varies over time. More recently, Kauffman (1991) , a mathematical biologist, found that this same law governs the relationship between the number of trials in a biological population and the rate at which the population finds variants better fit to the environment. He shows that the expected number of better variants can be described by the natural log of the number of trials that have occurred. Where s is the cumulative number of improvements in the population and g is the number of trials, .
Alternatively, one could consider the rate r(s) at which improvements appear in the population, .
Thus, the number of trials attempted in a given population provides a natural time scale for evolutionary processes. Since each organization represents a relatively unique combination of components within a niche, each organization can be considered a trial. Therefore, the evolutionary time scale in the development of industries is defined as the inverse of the cumulative number of foundings within the industry.
Interacting the log-quadratic model (1) with this evolutionary time scale results in the asymmetric founding model found in (4),
where y is the observed number of foundings in a given time period and t is the total number of prior time periods in the population history.
Interestingly, the interaction terms can be interpreted through another lens. Density divided by cumulative foundings essentially measures the degree to which the population retains its members (i.e. the complement of selection). Density-squared divided by cumulative foundings can be thought of as an interaction between the retention rate and density. Using this framework, one can easily see what effects to expect. If selection tends to increase the average fitness level in the population, higher rates of retention should increase founding rates (i.e. γ 4 0 > ). Furthermore, if selection leads to increased spacing of the remaining organizations, one would expect retention to increase the competitive impact of density (i.e. γ 5 0 < ). The interaction with the intercept term, γ 3 , captures the impact of the lack of legitimacy early in the population's history. A negative value for this parameter would indicate that the lack of legitimacy early in the population's history suppresses founding rates.
DATA AND ESTIMATION
Following the usual strategy of organizational ecology studies, data on the entire American automobile industry, rather than a sample, are used. The data set comprises information on all automobile producers known to operate within the United States between 1885 and 1981.
7 Information on the industry came primarily from the three volumes of the Standard Catalog of American Cars (Kimes and Clark, 1989; Flammang, 1989; Gunnell, Shrimpf and Buttolph, 1992) . These volumes contain entries for every car known to have been produced in the United States. Information from the New Encyclopedia of Motor Cars (Georgano, 1982) , the known producers. Producers were defined as any automobile manufacturer that "reached a level of production sufficient to generate an income, however small." (Carroll, et al., 1996, p. 16) Figure 3 shows the density of these manufacturers over the population's history. Each record contains a date at which business began and a date at which the firm ceased to exist, or the observation period ended.
Since we do not have information on the risk set for organizational foundings, founding rates can only be estimated as event counts. Firm entries into an industry occur throughout the year. Nevertheless, events are only coded accurate to the year of entry in the automobile industry data. To reflect this limitation, the analyses model yearly counts of organizational foundings. Thus, the sum of the number of organizations founded in each year provides the dependent variable. Figure 4 shows the distribution of founding over the course of the population's history. The cumulative total of foundings provides the evolutionary time variable. Specifically, the inverse of the cumulative foundings measures evolutionary time. Contemporaneous density is calculated by summing 1901 1905 1909 1913 1917 1921 1925 1929 1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 Figure 3: Population density over time (Baldwin, et al., 1987) , The Complete Guide to Kit Cars, Auto Parts and Accessories (Kutner,1974) and Automotive News (1993) completed the data set.
World Guide to Automobile Manufacturers
These sources provided a firm-level data file on all the number of organizations in existence in each year. Following earlier analyses of the American automobile industry Bigelow, et al., 1997) , several additional variables control for potentially confounding factors. The models include the total car production in the United States in millions of units, the total population in tens of millions Number of firms of people, the annual Gross National Product (GNP) in constant 1955 dollars, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) using 1900 prices as a baseline. 9 The models also include a period effect (coded 1 for 1939 to 1945 and 0 in all other years) to control for the impact of World War II on founding rates. Finally, Altshuler, Anderson and Jones (1984) suggest Researchers typically use negative binomial regression with maximum likelihood estimation to cope with unobserved heterogeneity and time-dependence in the rate. Nonetheless, maximum likelihood estimation still assumes independence of observations. Time series data, such as those used in founding rate models, often violate this assumption. For example, 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 that the nature of competition in the automobile industry can be classified into three distinct periods: mass production (1902-present), product differentiation (1950-present) and Japanese imports (1968-present) , so dummy variables control for these period effects.
With event count data, error distributions tend to be highly skewed because negative event counts cannot occur. The most common estimation procedure used to analyze such data is Poisson regression. This procedure assumes that an underlying Poisson process governs the occurrence of events. Nevertheless, under many circumstances, the assumptions of the Poisson process are violated. For example, Poisson processes assume that no unobserved heterogeneity exists; the independent variables completely describe the rate. Yet, theory in the social sciences rarely covers all possible sources of variance. Poisson regression also assumes the rate at which events occur to be constant (King, 1989) . Thus, it does not seem appropriate for these data.
contagion across time periods can create autocorrelation in the event counts (Barron, 1992) . To allow for this possibility, one can estimate the parameters using the quasi-likelihood estimation procedure. 10 Barron (1992) finds the quasi-likelihood estimation procedure to be more efficient in the presence of autocorrelation. Moreover, it sacrifices little or no efficiency even when the assumptions of maximum likelihood are not violated. Unfortunately, evaluating model fit under quasi-likelihood estimation is not as well understood as in maximum-likelihood estimation. Following Hannan, et al. (1995) , I report the root mean squared error of prediction (3) as a way of evaluating model fit. (3) where y is the actual event count and λ is the predicted count. To test comparisons of nested models, I use Haberman's (1977) χ². 
MODEL RESULTS
Estimates for firm entries appear in Table 1 . Model 1 presents a baseline model using only the traditional density-dependent terms and the control variables. Model 2 estimates the proposed model specification. To determine whether these effects might be driven by differences in the mode of competition, I include period effects in model 3 (see Bigelow, et al., 1997 lation learning specification to Hannan's (1997) chronological time specification in models 4 and 5.
12
The density-dependent formulation predicts a positive first-order effect and negative second-order effect of density on founding rates. Nearly all the models tested support these hypotheses. The firstorder effects are positive and significant and the second order effects are negative and significant. Also, as expected, the magnitude of the first-order effects are much larger than the magnitude of the secondorder effects.
The inclusion of the terms for population-level learning significantly improves the fit of the model. Haberman's χ² was 55.46 based on 3 degrees of freedom. These interaction terms also substantially improve the root mse from 6.72 to 4.09. Moreover, all three terms have significant coefficient estimates. Substantively, the results agree with those expected. Selection decreases the founding rate of American automobile manufacturers. It also decreases the intensity of competition among the remaining firms. The direct effect of the inverse of cumulative foundings is also significant and negative, suggesting that the first, few trials of an organizational form contribute most strongly to legitimacy.
One might think that the changes in industry dynamics can be neatly captured by the different market regimes over the course of the industry (Altshuler, Anderson, and Jones, 1984) . Model 3 tests for this by adding period effects for the different stages of the industry's history. Although the period effects do improve the model, they do not eliminate or even decrease the importance of evolutionary time. The endogenous changes in competition, mass production and product differentiation, add little to the model. Only the entry of Japanese competitors, an exogenous change in the population dynamics, has a significant effect on entry rates. As one might expect, the entry of Japanese competitors in the U.S. market depresses founding rates in the U.S.
Since selection processes correlate highly with chronological time, I compare the proposed specification to the density-dependence model using industry age interactions forwarded by Hannan (1997) . The results clearly show that the interactions with evolutionary time fit the data better than the interactions with chronological time. Although the difference cannot be tested strictly because the two models cannot be nested, the root mean squared errors for model 2 are substantially lower than those for model 4 using fewer degrees of freedom. When both sets of interaction terms appear in the same model (model 5), model fit improves only slightly, if at all, over the model with just the evolutionary time interactions. Although the χ² is significant, none of the coefficient estimates differ significantly from zero and a comparison of the models using the root mse suggests that the inclusion of the interactions with chronological time actually hurt the fit of the model. Moreover, the effects of the population learning terms overwhelm those of the industry age interactions.
The economic covariates have inconsistent, and generally quite weak, effects on the founding rate -the notable exception being the period effect for World War II. Entry rates during the war fell 93% below what one would have expected from the normal pattern of industry evolution.
DISCUSSION
The results of the model suggest that industry level adaptation does influence the rate of entry into the industry. Moreover, these effects appear to be consistent with those hypothesized. The interaction term between density and evolutionary time is significant and positive. As noted above, we can also think of this term as the degree of retention in the population. When the population retains more of its members, the entry rate of new organizations increases. The magnitude of this effect is substantial. For example, in model 2, the entry rate when a population retains all of its members is more than three times the rate for a population that selects out half of its members (exp[.5*2.357] = 3.25). Two processes could explain this effect. First, selection might increase the average fitness of the remaining organizations making entry into the niche less attractive, as hypothesized. Second, high retention rates could signal entrepreneurs that the niche provides attractive business opportunities since a high retention implies that few ventures fail. The second story differs from the first because it does not require selection to favor fitter organizations. Rather, retention simply measures population pressures. The interaction term with density squared offers more conclusive evidence for selection effects on density dependence.
The interaction term between density squared and evolutionary time provides information regarding the effect of spacing. As an interaction between the retention rate and density, it essentially measures how the impact of density changes with selection. As retention rates increase, the competitive effect of population density increases. Since fitter organization generate stronger competition (Barnett, 1997) , this suggests a decrease in competitive interaction among the surviving firms, as predicted.
Consistent with Hannan's (1997) arguments, the results also show that legitimacy has an asymmetric effect on organizational populations. The direct effect of the inverse of the total number of foundings on the founding rate is strongly negative. In other words, the lack of legitimacy early in the population's history severely depresses the founding rate. For example, even if the density remains constant (due to exits) in model 2, the founding rate will be more than ten times higher when ten organizations have entered the population than when only two organizations have entered the population (exp[(.1-.5)*-5.97] = 10.89).
13 While contemporaneous density still contributes to legitimacy, the first entrants into a niche appear to have a tremendous impact on the legitimation of the population.
To understand better the implications of these effects, Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the total effects of these terms. Figure 5 depicts the density at which the entry rate multiplier reaches its maximum over evolutionary time in the industry. Alternatively, one could view this as the point at which additional entrants deter entry into the niche. The graph clearly shows that the niche expands with the number of cumulative foundings. In the later stages of the industry, the carrying capacity of the niche nearly doubles relative to its level at the beginning of the industry. Figure 6 plots the value of the peak multiplier over evolutionary time.
14 In the early history of the industry, the decreasing rate of expansion in the market leads to a precipitous fall in the peak 1  65  130  195  260  325  390  455  520  585  650  715  780  845  910  975  1040  1105  1170  1235  1300  1365  1430  1495  1560  1625  1690  1755  1820  1885  1950  2015  2080  2145  2210  2275  2340 multiplier. As the industry continues to adapt though, the decrease in competitive pressures eventually overwhelms the effect of decreasing niche expansion. Thus, the peak multiplier actually begins to rise again as the industry continues to mature. This effect can explain the upturn in foundings often observed at the end of long population histories.
The fact that the interactions between chronological time and density may slightly improve the model after the inclusion of the population-level learning terms could point to a problem with one of the assumptions of the population learning model. Two deviations seem likely. First, for selection to improve the average fit of the survivors, the environment must be stable. Otherwise, the conditions under which these organizations have been selected will not match those under which they compete. Selection based on environmental conditions that no longer exist could actually be detrimental to organizational fit after a shift in conditions. While the automobile industry might be quite stable, it seems likely that over the course of nearly 100 years that the environment might have drifted. Second, learning at the organization level could raise the overall fitness of the population without selection (e.g., Barnett and Hansen, 1996) . Since these changes occur in chronological time as well, the interaction terms between chronological time and density probably pick up these changes.
In future research, it might be interesting to combine these models which allow for temporal heterogeneity in density dependence with spatial heterogeneity Bigelow, et al., 1997) . For example, the importance of foundings as a source of legitimacy might decline rapidly as a function of global foundings, rather than the cumulative number of foundings in any particular region. Interestingly, the models of spatial and temporal heterogeneity seem to predict conflicting effects. While multi-level models suggest that the scope of competition broadens over time , my results find a decline in competitive interaction as selection removes organizations from the population. The resolution of this apparent discrepancy seems like an interesting topic for future research.
Like earlier research, this study shows asymmetry in founding rates. Specifically, it demonstrates that selection systematically modifies the nature of competition. On the one hand, selection raises the bar for entry into the population. On the other hand, it provides new opportunities for entrepreneurs by distributing the remaining firms across the resource space leaving exploitable interstices. These effects explain both the intensification of competition in a population over time and the eventual resurgence in entry rates. Although this study focuses on founding rates, one would expect the same type of interaction effects to affect mortality rates. Since evolutionary processes alter founding rates through asymmetry in both legitimacy and competition, rather than directly, these processes should create similar asymmetries in the relationship between mortality rates and density.
Beyond ecology, this study provides an example of how one might systematically model path dependence in social systems. Formal models of social systems, like the density dependence model, typically consider processes to be ahistoric, yet rich histories of industries, organizations, political regimes, and other social systems often highlight the role of path dependence in their development. Despite this interest in path dependence, many scholars suggest that these processes cannot be considered formally because we typically have only one case -the history that we know. Nevertheless, by using theory as a guide, we can develop testable models of path dependence. This paper develops such a model for the relationship between selection, fitness and competitive interaction in a stable environment. Although I apply this relationship to density dependence, one could apply it to a variety of problems. For example, a similar relation might explain the association between network stability or positive affect and the history of tie dissolution/formation amongst a group of individuals. One could also develop models for processes other than selection that generate path dependence. Thus, I would encourage other quantitative researchers to incorporate into their models and test the intuition that path dependence systematically changes the behavior of social systems.
1 Specifically, from combinatorial topology, we know that the number of possible competitive relations increases at ( ) n n − 1 2 , where n is the number of competitors.
2 Some research on density dependence, especially early in its development, models the relationship as a generalized-Yule process:
( ) λ β α t t t n n = exp 2 , where α provides information on the legitimacy effect and β represents the competitive effect. 3 The type of population learning considered here takes a very specific form. How do selection processes alter the distribution of the population? Admittedly, organizations might adapt to some degree. Nevertheless, this adaptation implies a tradeoff. To the extent that organizations can adapt, selection pressures become less important as a means of learning at the population level because the selected firms will not be stable (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . 4 One might also imagine that selection could occur prior to founding in terms of which organizations actually begin operations. Although this type of selection seems interesting, it may not affect population processes in the same manner as firm failure because these entrepreneurial ideas do not necessarily compete for resources. Thus, their failed realization could be completely unrelated to the potential venture's fitness. For this reason, I focus on the failure of organizations that actually begin operations. 5 One could also think of this increased average fitness as an expansion in the niche volume of each organization. 6 Alternatively, if one thinks of organizations as being centered on a point in a multidimensional resource space, surviving firms tend to be maximally spaced throughout the hypervolume representing the industry's niche. 7 For additional information on the American automobile industry data, see Carroll and Hannan (1995), Carroll, et al. (1995) and Bigelow, et al. (1997) . 8 In an event history data set, these cases are classified as censored. 9 The CPI indexes prices for a basket of consumer goods. The base year always has a CPI of 100 (i.e. 100%). Thus, if the CPI in a particular year is 120, a typical set of consumer goods costs 20% more than it did in the baseline year. 10 These models can be implemented using David Barron's GAUSS program. 11 For a complete discussion of Haberman's χ², see p.214 of Agresti (1990) . 12 The period effects could not be included in the models with Hannan's (1997) industry age interactions because the models failed to converge. 13 If ten organizations enter, 1 over the number of entrants equals .1, whereas 1 over the number of entrants equals .5 when only two organizations have entered. 14 The range of multipliers is attenuated because the peak multiplier values do not make sense in the range in which they are undefined. Until the peak density falls below the total number of organizations that have ever existed, which occurs at approximately Trials = 395 in the Automobile industry, the peak multiplier is only a abstract construct.
